ABSTRACT Rational delegation of computation is an important technology of mobile Internet at present, which is significant to the construction of intelligent urban computing. In order to close to practical applications, many tasks need cooperation with edge computing and cloud computing. The delegated computation scheme with rational players guarantees the reliability of the calculation results by the utility function. This paper studies the rational delegation of computation and the security attack-defense from attack and defense. Combining with the concept of average mutual information in information theory, this paper presents the attack and defense model for rationally delegating the computation. The main method of modeling is to convert the attack or defense of rationally delegated computation into communication problems in information theory and construct the attack channel and defense channel for the client and the calculator respectively. The channel capacity of the attack channel represents the attack capacity limitation of the adversary in the delegated computing environment, and that of the defense channel denotes the defense capacity limitation of clients in the delegated computation. Then, we discuss the relationship between attack limitation and defense limitation, and it shows that there are different strengths and weaknesses between the calculator and the client under different mixed strategies. Finally, the numerical analysis of experiments demonstrates that the optimal strategy of attack and defense is the strategy when the game between client and calculator reaches the equilibrium point.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computation delegation [1] is an important application of big data and edge/cloud computing environments. In the increasingly mature Internet of Things, edge computing is close to the end-user devices. It contributes to cloud data acquisition and supports large data analysis of cloud applications. Cloud computing can send business rules to the edge through large data analysis for execution and optimization.
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Edge computing and cloud computing work together to enable the digital transformation of the industry and achieve intelligent urban computing. Traditional computation delegation is that, a client with weak computing power or limited computing resources can delegate an untrustworthy cloud server with powerful computing to complete a computation task; meanwhile, the results obtained are verifiable, i.e., the correctness of results can be proved. It effectively solves the security problem in cloud computing. The verification mechanism used to verify the integrity and reliability of computing results has been a hot research topic; the majority of existing studies mainly construct a computation delegation scheme based on the computational complexity theory and cryptography technology. However, there is little research on the attack and defense limitation of players in terms of the delegated computation. Combining the computation delegation and information theory, we transform the problem of the attack and defense ability of the delegated computation into its capacity, and then obtain the computing and delegation ability limitation by simply constructing the convertible attack and defense channels. According to this line of thought and game theory, we propose the optimal attack and defense strategy under the rationally delegated computing environment.
With the rapid development of big data and Internet, more and more devices are connected to the Internet, which constitutes the Internet-of-Things (IoT). The cybersecurity has always been a key problem to be solved urgently in the development of the IoT. In 2018, Ma et al. [2] proposed a new efficient architecture to achieve accountable anonymous access to service-based IoT networks, in which delegate is used to prevent intermediate nodes or receivers from obtaining identity information of clients and to provide guarantees for their behaviors. Ma et al. [3] later proposed a new architecture to support distributed computing in Named Data Network (NDN) and introduced a scheme to use computing resources anonymously by consumers. As a node in the proposed NDN architecture, delegate can provide the required computing resources for anonymous consumers, which will reduce the delay of data transmission and the overhead of bandwidth in the backbone network. Ma et al. [4] proposed the first scalable architecture for balancing accountability and privacy in content-based networks (APCN) in 2019. A doubledelegate paradigm is proposed to improve the performance and alleviate the scalability issue on content accountability in large-scale networks. Therefore, the delegated computing has always been an important application technology in the Internet of Things scenario.
Traditional delegated computation is mainly based on the construction of computational complexity theory and cryptography technology. Firstly, the main tools used in the construction of the delegated computation scheme based on complexity theory are interactive proof systems, PCP theorem, quadratic extension program, etc. As early as 1985, Babai [5] first proposed an interactive proof system. Unlike traditional proof systems, Babai's model allows computers and verifiers to interactively deliver messages to prove each result. Goldwasser et al. [6] designed the ''Muggle Proof'' model according to the practical application requirements, and limited the capacity of the calculators and verifiers to ensure the efficiency of the calculators. In 1998, Arora and Safra [7] proved NP = PCP(O(log(n)), O(1)), which is called PCP theorem. In 2013, Gennaro et al. [8] defined Quadratic Span Programs (QSPs) for NP complex classes and used them to construct SNARK to avoid using PCP. Secondly, in the research of cryptography, the cryptography tools used are mainly full homomorphic encryption [9] , [10] , homomorphic MAC/signature [11] , etc. As early as 1993, Chaum and Pedersen [12] proposed the ''Electronic Wallet'' model and constructed a specific protocol with blind signature, which opened the prelude of research on delegation computation by cryptography. In 2010, Gennaro et al. [13] used Garbled Circuit [14] proposed by Yao to construct the first non-interactive verifiable delegated computation scheme for arbitrary functions. User outsourcing computing is mainly due to insufficient computing power and limited storage capacity in the delegated computation. In this case, Zhang and Safavi-Nainiy [15] constructed several schemes for agent computation of polynomial functions and matrix products, which allowed clients to increase the validation verification time appropriately to reduce the cost of cloud storage; the authors then proposed a new multi-server locally verifiable calculation model [16] , in which the client can outsource the data module to multiple servers and then verify the calculation of any module. Catalano et al. [17] constructed a new homomorphic signature scheme applicable to the determination of multiple polynomials of order by adopting the technique of stratified and hierarchical coding, which improved the verification efficiency of the signature. However, most traditional computation delegation schemes require the calculator to send reliability proof to the client, and the client verifies the correctness of the computation results; however, the computational complexity of the verification process is relatively high. At the same time, the scheme assumes that the players are either honest and abide by the protocol, or malicious and arbitrarily implemented protocols, when in fact the participants have different preferences. Therefore, it is of practical significance to construct rationally delegated computing protocols by introducing rational players to solve the problem of high computation and communication cost in the verification process through utility.
In recent years, the research of the delegated computation from rationality has been paid more attention. In 2012, Azar and Micali [18] presented a rational proof system based on appropriate scoring rules. The novelty of this system is that the proof is neither honest nor malicious, but rational, while the prover has infinite computing power and the interaction ability of the verifier is polynomial time. In 2013, Azar and Micali [19] utilized the Utility Gaps idea to construct a super effective rational proof system. The system is much faster than other relevant systems and provides real incentives for experts to be honest. In 2014, Guo et al. [20] studied rational arguments with limited computing capacity of provers. In 2016, Chen et al. [21] studied the rational proof of multiple provers from complexity theory. In 2017, Inasawa and Yasunaga [22] proposed a three-message delegation scheme in which the verifier was rational.
In the rationally delegated computing protocol, the server needs to prove the correctness of the calculation results to the client, so the calculator is generally called a prover and the client is a verifier. Although some scholars had proved that calculator has infinite computing ability and client has polynomial time interactive capability, few researches have described the attack and defense capacity limitation of the calculator and the client. Therefore, there is still a vague understanding of the capacity limitation in the delegated computation. In fact, the players may deviate from the protocol for their own benefit, and the calculator may send wrong results, and the client may refuse the results returned by the calculator, all of which are the waste of computing resources and the reduction of benefits. Both the client as a defender and the calculator as an attacker in the communication aim to obtain the maximum information from the locked object terminal, and the essential characteristic of the attack and defense is the antagonism and strategic dependence of attacker and defender. Attackers always hope to maximize the benefits by destroying the service quality, while defenders manage to minimize the damage to the system in the attack and defense environment. In view of these problems, according to Yang's work [23] , this paper combines the delegated computation and information theory, and considers the attack and defense confrontation between the client and the calculator as a noncooperative game from players' self-interest. The key to construct the scheme is to use random variables to model the communication between client and calculator. We construct the attack channel and defense channel models of calculator and client, respectively, and analyze the computing capacity and delegation capacity limitations with channel capacity. It is proved that the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists in the game, and the optimal attack and defense strategy can be found from this equilibrium point. This paper explores the capacity limitation of the delegated computation from a new view of the fusion of game theory and information theory. The main contributions are as follows:
1) Based on the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, players first lock their own demands (optimization objective), represent the input message and output message (game strategies) of the players with random variables, and assign weights to each strategy. We formalize the attack and defense strategies of the calculator and the client. 2) The attack and defense channels of information transmission are constructed. We analyze the channel capacity and then give the attack and defense capacity limitation for one-to-one confrontation. The capacity limitation of players is transformed into capacity, and the capacity limitation is calculated by using the average mutual information in information theory. 3) Since rational players participate in the protocol for the purpose of maximizing their utility, we search for the optimal attack and defense strategies under different conditions, and analyze the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game from the experimental results. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We give a brief exposition of game theory, information theory and the related definitions in Section 2. Section 3 makes a game analysis of the basic strategies of the calculator and the client with utility function. In Section 4, we construct new attack models and defense models of rationally delegated computing based on information theory, and then analyze the attack and defense capacity limitation; after that, the optimal attack and defense strategy is obtained. Section 5 carries out experimental study, analyzes the simulation results, and obtains the optimal attack and defense strategy. In Section 6, we discuss our findings and present the future work. Finally, Section 7 gives a conclusion.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. GAME THEORY Definition 1 (Standard Game): The standard form of a n-player game is composed of three elements: player set P, strategy space S and utility function u, denoted as G = {P, S, u}, where
Any specific strategy s i ∈ S i indicates that strategy s i is the key element of the strategy set S i , and utility function u i :∈ S → R (R represents the real number space) denotes the profits of the players i under different strategy profiles.
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium): A strategy profile
Obviously, if player i = j complies with the strategy s * i , then the player j will not deviate from the strategy s * j , because it will not benefit at all. In principle, there may be multiple Nash equilibrium in a game.
The concept of ''mixed strategy'' is introduced in the game, as each player may try to guess the strategy choices of other players, which is interpreted as the uncertainty of one player considering the behavior of other players.
Definition 4 (Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium): In the two-player standard game G = {S 1 , S 2 ; u 1 , u 2 }, the mixed strategy (P * 1 , P * 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium, if and only if the mixed strategy of each player is the optimal reaction of the other player's mixed strategy. For the mixed strategy P 1 = {p 11 , · · · , p 1J } chosen by player 1 (J denotes the number of pure strategies contained in S 1 ), the mixed strategy P 2 = {p 21 , · · · , p 2K } chosen by player 2 (K is the number of pure strategies contained in S 2 ), and the expected benefits v of players, P * 1 satisfies:
The condition holds for all possible probability distributions P 1 of the strategies in S 1 , and P * 2 satisfies:
The inequality also holds for all possible probability distributions P 2 of the strategies in S 2 .
According to the definition of Nash Equilibrium Theorem:
among n players, if n is finite, and S i is finite for each i, then there is at least one Nash equilibrium in the game, which may contain mixed strategies. In 1952, Glicksberg [24] proved the following Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (The Existence of Nash Equilibrium):
In the standard game G = {S 1 , S 2 , · · · , S n ; u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u n } with n players, if n is finite, S i is a non-empty compact set of metric spaces for each i. If the utility function u i is continuous, then the game has Nash equilibrium of mixed strategy.
In any game, a Nash Equilibrium is the intersection point corresponding to the optimal reaction between the players, even if the game involves more than two players, or some (or all) players have more than two pure strategies. There are two methods to find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium [25] : one is the payment maximization method, and the other is the payment equivalence method; the two methods are equivalent. The simulation results in this paper use the payment equivalence method to find the Nash equilibrium of the mixed strategy of the client and the calculator.
B. INFORMATION THEORY

Definition 5 (Mutual Information):
Another random variable causes to reduce the decrement of uncertainty of the original random variable. The mutual information,
denotes the decrement of uncertainty about X between before and after receiving Y . It is also the metric of independent degree between two random variables. It is symmetrical about X and Y and nonnegative, the mutual information is 0 if and only if X and Y are mutually independent.
Theorem 2 (Convex Function of Mutual Information):
is a concave function of p(x) (mutual information is an upper concave function on any closed convex set, so the local maximum is the global maximum). Since mutual information is finite, the concave function has a maximum value (channel capacity) in the domain of definition. If p(x) is fixed, mutual information 
Definition 6 (Communication Channel):
The general communication channel model [26] is shown in Figure 1 , where such a system X and Y are regarded as two random signal sources whose output depends probabilistically on the input. Its characteristics are determined by a transition probability matrix p(y x), which gives the conditional probability distribution of the output when the input is known. In general, the capacity of a communication channel is defined as C = maxI (X ; Y ) for the input X and the output Y .
Theorem 3 (Shannon Channel Coding Theory):
For discrete memoryless channels, all the bit rates smaller than channel capacity C are reachable, or it can be visually interpreted that all signals whose bit rates do not exceed channel capacity C can be transmitted from the sender to the receiver without error.
III. GAME MODEL OF DELEGATING COMPUTATION A. RATIONAL COMPUTATION DELEGATION MODEL
Rational delegation of computation combines the game theory with delegation of computation to guarantee the correctness and reliability of the calculation results from self-interest of the players. The following is the analysis of rational delegation of computation. Suppose the client P 1 and the calculator P 2 are rational players. The client P 1 has secret computing task E, the rational delegation of computation process is shown in Figure 2 . P 1 sends task x i and function f (·) to calculator P 2 . P 2 receives x i and f (·), and calculates f (X ) by using its resources and the function f (·). After the calculation, P 2 sends the result Y = f (X ) to P 1 . Finally, P 1 chooses whether to receive f (X ). Since the players are rational, the calculator P 2 may send an incorrect result or do not send any result. The process of delegation of calculation has no verification information. 
B. GAME MODEL
The game tree of the delegation of computation constructed in this paper is shown in Figure 3 , where the solid node is the selection information set of the client P 1 or the calculator P 2 . First, the client P 1 chooses whether to outsource task E; the delegation computation fails if it does not. Given the practical significance of outsourcing computation, we ignore this situation. If outsourcing succeeds, because both the client P 1 and the calculator P 2 are rational, P 2 wants to save cost to boost its benefit so that it may choose to send a wrong result. The strategy set of P 2 is {Send the correct result, Send a wrong result}. Since the client of this paper does not verify the correctness of the results, the strategy set of P 1 is {Receive, Not Accept}. In the Figure 3 , u i denotes the utility of client P i .
IV. ATTACK AND DEFENSE MODELS OF DELEGATION COMPUTATION
Assumption 1: An attacker is a rational decision-maker who will not attack unprofitably.
Assumption 2: An Attacker always seeks to maximize the benefits obtained from attacks. For example, an attacker tends to attack in the ways that do the most damage to the target resource.
In the attack-defense game, both attacker and defender want to maximize their interests through the optimal strategy. We assume that they are rational and reasonable. Based on the two reasonable assumptions above, the conflict between the attacker and the defender can be described as a strategic attack-defense game model, and the optimal strategy of both sides can be obtained by calculating the Nash equilibrium point of the game.
A. COMMUNICATION MODEL OF ONE-TO-ONE DELEGATION COMPUTATION
In the delegated computing scheme with only one client and one calculator, P 1 first chooses whether to outsource task E to a calculator. We have considered the practical meaning of delegation computation in advance, so the behavior of P 1 not outsourcing is ignored at this stage; similarly, there must be a calculator P 2 to take on the computation tasks. That is why they are profitable.
Next, calculator P 2 calculates the task, and returns the result to client P 1 . Then, P 1 chooses whether to accept the result according to its judgment. P 1 chooses to accept or reject the result from attack and defense instead of verifying it. The following is a detailed explanation.
First, the channel model is modeled for the reciprocal process.
Suppose that the strategies of calculator P 2 and client P 1 can be expressed by random variables X and Y , respectively. P 2 sending the wrong result is denoted as X = 1 and sending the correct result is denoted as X = 0. P 1 rejecting the returned result is denoted as Y = 1, and accepting is denoted as Y = 0. According to the Law of Large Numbers in Probability Theory, frequency limitation tends to probability, thus according to the past statistical rule, players' strategies can be expressed by the probability distribution of random variables X and Y as follows.
P r (X = 1) = p, the probability P 2 sends a ''wrong result'', where 0 < p < 1; P r (X = 0) = 1 − p, the probability P 2 sends a ''corret result'', where 0 < p < 1; P r (Y = 1) = q, the probability P 1 does not accept the result, where 0 < q < 1; P r (Y = 0) = 1 − q, the probability P 1 accepts the result, where 0 < q < 1.
Similarly, the joint probability distributions of twodimension random variable (X , Y ) are calculated as follows.
P r (X = 1, Y = 1) = a, the probability that P 2 sends a ''wrong result'' and P 1 does not accept it;
P r (X = 1, Y = 0) = b, the probability that P 2 sends an ''wrong result'' and P 1 accepts it; P r (X = 0, Y = 1) = c, the probability that P 2 sends a ''corret result'' and P 1 does not accept it; P r (X = 0, Y = 0) = d, the probability that P 2 sends a ''corret result'' and P 1 accepts it.
where 0 < p, q, r, a, b, c, d < 1, and the following three linear relations hold:
In a one-to-one scenario, both the calculator and the client have different attack and defense strategies. The following is to calculate the attack and defense capacity limitations of the calculator and the client. Since any two random variables can constitute a communication channel, the four random variables are constructed respectively by the random variables X and Y below:
1) CALCULATOR SUCCESSFULLY ATTACKS CLIENT
When the calculator sends a wrong result, the client is successfully attacked if it accepts the wrong result returned by the calculator. Construct
It denotes the calculator's attack channel with X as input and Z 1 as output.
2) CALCULATOR SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDS CLIENT
when the client accepts the result sent by the calculator, at this point, the result returned by the calculator is correct. Construct
It denotes the calculator's defense channel with X as input and Z 2 as output.
3) CLIENT SUCCESSFULLY ATTACKS CALCULATOR
when the calculator sends the correct result, the client successfully attacks the calculator if it does not accept the correct result. Construct
It denotes the client's attack channel with Y as input and Z 3 as output. VOLUME 7, 2019 4) CLIENT SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDS CALCULATOR when the calculator sends the wrong result, the client successfully defends the calculator if it does not accept the wrong result. Construct
It denotes the client's defense channel with Y as input and Z 4 as output.
5) CALCULATOR ATTACK CAPACITY LIMITATION FOR ONE-TO-ONE CONFRONTATION
Construct a random variable
where X is the input and Z 1 is the output. We get a communication channel (X ; Z 1 ) that is the attack channel F 2 of the calculator P 2 . In this case, the calculator's purpose is to attack the client, that is, sending the wrong result to the client maliciously. The following equation holds {calculator successfully attacks} ={calculator sends a error result ∩ client accepts the error result}
={1 bit information is successfully transmitted from the sender (X ) to the receiver (Z 1 ) in communication system F 2 }
In short, if one of the attacks succeeds, channel F 2 transmits 1 bit successfully; otherwise, if one bit is successfully transmitted from the sender to the receiver, the calculator actually successfully attacks the client once. Therefore, we combine with the Channel Coding Theorem of Shannon's Information Theory [20] : if the capacity of attack channel F 2 is C 1 , then for any transmission rate k n ≤ C 1 , k bits can be successfully transmitted to the receiver through a code word of n bit length in case of arbitrarily small decoding error. On the contrary, if attack channel F 2 can transmit S bits to the receiver without error with n bits codeword, then S ≤ nC 1 .
Theorem 4 (Calculator Attack Capacity Theorem for Oneto-One Confrontation): Suppose that the capacity of attack channel F 2 composed of random variables (X ; Z 1 ) is C 1 . If the calculator wants to attack the client k times successfully, then there must be some skills (corresponding to Shannon code) that enable it to achieve attack k C 1 times with the probability of arbitrarily close to 1. On the contrary, if the calculator has succeeded S 1 times out of n times, then there must be S 1 ≤ nC 1 .
According to Theorem 4, as long as the channel capacity C 1 of attack channel F 2 is obtained, the attack capability limit of the calculator can be determined. We only need a general method of information theory, i.e., using a channel transition probability matrix A to calculate the channel capacity C 1 of F 2 .
First, consider the communication system F 2 taking X as input and Z 1 as output. The 2 × 2 order transfer probability matrix is A = [A(x, z 1 )] = P r (z 1 |x), z 1 , x = 0, 1, and then
Then, the transfer matrix of F 2 can be expressed as
The joint probability distributions of random variables (X , Z 1 ) can be given by
Therefore, the mutual information I (X , Z 1 ) between X and Z 1 is
The channel capacity C 1 of channel F 2 with X as input and Z 1 as output is therefore equal to max[I (X , Z 1 )]. The maximum here is for X as all possible binary discrete random variables. In other words, the capacity C 1 equals max 0<a,p<1
[I (X , Z 1 )]; it is taken for two variables a and p under the conditions 0 < a, p < 1. Note: at this point, q is no longer a variable but a constant value. It can be seen that the channel capacity C 1 of the channel F 2 is a function of q that denotes as C 1 (q).
6) CALCULATOR DEFEND CAPACITY LIMITATION FOR ONE-TO-ONE CONFRONTATION
Construct a random variable
where X is the input and Z 2 is the output. We get a communication channel (X ; Z 2 ) that is the defense channel G 2 of P 2 . The purpose of P 2 in this case is to defend the client. That is, when the calculator sends a correct result, the delegate will accept it. The equation below therefore holds {calculator successfully defends} ={calculator sends the correct result ∩ client receives the correct result}
={1bit information is successfully transmitted from the sender (X ) to the receiver (Z 2 ) in communication system G 2 } Similar to the case of attack channel F 2 , conversely, the above event equation indicates that if 1 bit is successfully transmitted from the sender (X ) to the receiver (Z 2 ) in defense channel G 2 , then P 2 has a successful defense.
Similarly, with Shannon's ''channel coding theorem'', we can get theorem 5.
Theorem 5 (Calculator Defense capacity Theorem for One-to-One Confrontation):
Suppose that the capacity of defense channel G 2 composed of random variables (X ; Z 2 ) is C 2 . If the calculator wants to successfully defend the client k times, then there must be some skills (corresponding to Shannon code), so that it can achieve the goal k C 2 times with the probability of arbitrarily close to 1. Conversely, if the calculator has succeeded S 2 times out of n times, then there must be S 2 ≤ nC 2 .
According to Theorem 5, we can determine the defense capacity limit of the calculator as long as we obtain the channel capacity C 2 of the defense channel G 2 . We only use the channel transfer probability matrix B to calculate the channel capacity C 2 .
First, consider a communication system G 2 consisting of random variables X and Z 2 that takes X as input and Z 2 as output. Its 2 × 2 order transfer probability matrix is B = [B(x, z 2 )] = P r (z 2 |x), z 2 , x = 0, 1, and then
Then, the transfer matrix of G 2 is
The joint probability distribution of random variables (X ; Z 2 ) are
Therefore, the mutual information I (X , Z 2 ) between X and Z 2 is
The channel capacity C 2 of G 2 is therefore equal to max[I (X , Z 2 )]. The maximum is calculated for X as all possible binary discrete random variables. In other words, the capacity C 2 equals max 0<a,p<1
[I (X , Z 2 )], and the maximum is taken for two variables a and p under the conditions 0 < a, p < 1. Note: q is no longer a variable but a constant value. The channel capacity C 2 of G 2 is a function of q that denotes as C 2 (q).
7) CLIENT ATTACK CAPACITY LIMITATION FOR ONE-TO-ONE CONFRONTATION
Construct a random variable
It is the attack channel F 1 : (Y ; Z 3 ) with Y as input and Z 3 as the output of P 1 . At this point, the delegate attacks the calculator. That is, when the calculator returns a correct result, the client will reject the result. Thus, the event equation below holds. {client successfully attacks} ={client does not accept the correct result ∩ the calculator sends the correct result} ={Y = 1, X = 0} = {Y = 0, Z 3 = 1} ={1bit information is successfully transmitted from the sender (Y ) to the receiver (Z 3 ) in communication system F 1 } Similarly, if 1 bit is successfully transmitted from the sender to the receiver in channel F 1 , the client will achieve attack once. Similarly, we get Theorem 6.
Theorem 6 (Client Attack Capacity Theorem for One-toOne Confrontation):
Suppose that the capacity of attack channel F 1 consisting of random variables (Y ; Z 3 ) is C 3 . If the client wants to attack the calculator k times, there must be some skills (corresponding to Shannon code) that enables it to achieve the attack k C 3 times with the probability of arbitrarily close to 1. Conversely, if the client has succeeded S 3 times out of n times, there must be S 3 ≤ nC 3 .
Similarly, the client's attack capacity limit can be determined by acquiring the channel capacity C 3 of the attack channel F 1 . We use the channel transfer probability matrix D to calculate channel capacity C 3 of F 1 .
First, consider the communication system F 1 consisting of random variables Y and Z 3 that takes Y as input and Z 3 as output. Its transfer probability matrix is D = [D(y, z 3 )] = P r (z 3 |y), z 3 , y = 0, 1, and then
Then, the transfer matrix of communication system F 1 is
The joint probability distribution of random variables (Y ; Z 3 ) is
The channel capacity C 3 of F 1 is therefore equal to max
The maximum is taken for two variables a and q under conditions 0 < a, q < 1. Note: p is regarded as a constant value at this time, and the channel capacity C 3 of the channel F 1 is a function of p that denotes as C 3 (p).
8) CLIENT DEFENSE CAPACITY LIMITATION FOR ONE-TO-ONE CONFRONTATION
Construct a random variable
We get a defense channel If the client wants to successfully defend the calculator k times, then there must be some skills (corresponding to Shannon code) to achieve the goal k C 4 times with the probability of arbitrarily close to 1. Conversely, if the client has succeeded S 4 times out of n times, then there must be S 4 ≤ nC 4 .
Theorem 7 shows that the defensive capacity limitation can be determined only if the channel capacity C 4 of defense channel G 1 is obtained. Next, let us calculate the channel capacity C 4 . First, consider the communication system G 1 that takes Y as input and Z 4 as output. The transfer probability matrix is E = [E(y, z 4 )] = P r (z 4 |y), z 4 , y = 0, 1, then
The transfer matrix of communication system G 1 is
The joint probability distribution of random variables (Y ; Z 4 ) is
The channel capacity of the defense channel G 1 of the client is C 4 = max Z 4 ) is the mutual information formula above, and the maximum is obtained under the conditions 0 < a, q < 1. Note: p is treated as a constant. It can be seen that the defense channel capacity C 4 of the client is a function of p that records as C 4 (p).
B. COMPARE OF ATTACK AND DEFENSE CONFRONTATION CAPACITY BETWEEN CLIENT AND CALCULATOR
We find Equation (3) is equal to (4) , that is, the mutual information I (X , Z 1 ) of attacking channel F 2 of calculator is equal to the mutual information I (X , Z 2 ) of defensive channel G 2 of calculator. We call the combined channel of these two channels computation channel, denoted as (X , Z x ); And Equation (5) is equal to (6) , that is, the mutual information I (Y , Z 3 ) of the attack channel F 1 of the client is equal to the mutual information I (Y , Z 4 ) of defense channel G 1 . We call the combined channel as delegation channel, denoted as (Y , Z y ).
Because the random variables X and Y are independent of each other, P r (X = 1) = p, P r (Y = 1) = q, P r (X = 1, Y = 1) = a, so a = p * q. We substitute the equation a = p * q into the Equation (4) then the following equation can be obtained.
Substituting the equation a = p * q into Equation (6) has
Therefore, the channel capacity of the computing channel
to Equation (7), and the channel capacity of the delegated
equal to Equation (8) .
Combining theorems 4, 5, 6 and 7, we give quantitative results on the final winning or losing situation of the players and the game skills. If the channel capacity of the computational channel and the client channel are C x (q) and C y (p), respectively, then in a one-to-one confrontation, the calculator and the client can change the values of C x (q) and C y (p) by adjusting the corresponding probability p and q, so as to improve their own victory in the confrontation. Then when C x (q) > C y (p), the calculator will succeed; when C x (q) < C y (p), the client will succeed; if C x (q) = C y (p), the two are equal in strength.
C. NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND OPTIMAL ATTACK AND DEFENSE STRATEGY OF DELEGATION COMPUTATION 1) NASH EQUILIBRIUM OF DELEGATION COMPUTATION
We revisit the one-to-one communication between calculator and client, construct two special standard two-player games between the channel and sender (receiver)
calculator, client and their own channels. The calculator and the client are input respectively, and random variables Z 1 , Z 3 or Z 2 and Z 4 are output. We assume the transfer matrix of the computing and the delegated channel is determined, that is,
. If X and Y are random variables with n and m values, the strategic space S 1 of player P 2 (calculator) is defined as S 1 = {0 ≤ x i ≤ 1 : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, x 1 +x 2 +· · ·+x n = 1}. It is an n−1 dimensional closed sub-cube in an n-dimensional closed cube with a side length of 1, that is, a non-empty compact convex set in Euclidean space. The strategic space S 2 of player P 1 (client) is defined as S 2 = {0 ≤ y j ≤ 1 : 1 ≤ j ≤ m, y 1 + y 2 + · · · + y m = 1}, which is also a non-empty compact convex set in Euclidean space.
For any two specific mixed strategies of players P 1 and P 2 in the computing channel and the delegation channel, we define their utility functions respectively.
a) The utility function of calculator P 2
The utility function u 2 is equal to I (X , Z 1 ), where the probability distribution function of Z 1 is determined by the probability distribution functions p( 
, so that each player's mixed strategy is the optimal response of the other player's mixed strategy. That is, Equations (1) and (2) in section 2 hold at the same time.
2) OPTIMAL ATTACK AND DEFENSE STRATEGY OF DELEGATION COMPUTATION
We give the optimal attack and defense strategy that satisfies the expectations of both sides.
Let the set of all attack methods of attacker be A = {α 1 , α 2 , · · · α m }, and the set of all defense methods of defender be B = {β 1 , β 2 , · · · β n }, and let the m × n matrix G = g ij be the income matrix of attacker and also the loss matrix of defender. The set of random variables
respectively denote the set of mixed attack and defense strategies of attacker and defender, where random variable x ∈ S 1 and y ∈ S 2 are respectively the mixed attack and defense strategies of attacker and defender. The attack and defense means pair (x, y) is a group of mixed situations. In this situation, the income function of the attacker is
such that a new set of attack and defense countermeasure (x, y) is called the mixed expansion of countermeasure.
Assume that a mixed strategy x = (x 1 , · · · , x m ) is the frequency of the attackers adopt attack means in the repeated confrontation based on the income matrix G. If there is only one attack and defense, the mixed strategy x = (x 1 , · · · , x m ) is assumed as the preference of the attacker for various attack methods. Suppose there is a rational confrontation between the two. When the attacker adopts the mixed strategy x, it only wants to obtain (the worst situation) revenue min y∈S 2
E(x, y).
Therefore, the attacker selects x ∈ S 1 to make this equation obtain the maximum value (the best situation among worst situations), that is, the attacker can ensure its expected profit is not less than
Similarly, the defender can guarantee its expected loss is at most 
If the mixed expansion of attacker and defender satisfies equation
Then V is called the optimal strategy value of attack and defense, and the mixed situation (x * , y * ) that makes this equation established is the optimal solution of both sides in the mixed strategy. x * and y * is called the optimal strategy of attacker and the optimal strategy of defender, respectively.
V. EXPERIMENT RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
We simulate the mutual information of the computing channel and the delegated channel, and deduce the channel capacity. In the experiment, the step size is 0.05. The experimental simulation of the mutual information I (X , Z x ) of the computing channel (X , Z x ) is shown in Figure 4 , where the channel capacity is obtained where q = 0.5. Therefore, when the maximum channel capacity is C x = 0.5310 (bit/s), the computing capacity limitation reaches the maximum. If the calculator wants to succeed, according to Shannon channel coding theorem, there must be a coding method that makes the information whose code rate does not exceed the channel capacity can be transmitted from the sender to the receiver without error, that is, if calculator succeeds S times out of n, then there must be S ≤ nC x . be a coding method to make the code rate less than the channel capacity C y reachable. Table 1 shows the comparison of the confrontation capacity of calculator and defender under different mixed strategies. When p and q satisfy condition 1.1, the calculated channel capacity is greater than the delegated channel capacity, so u 2 > u 1 and the calculator is more dominant. On the contrary, delegated channel capacity is greater than the calculated channel capacity under condition 1.3, so the client has an overall advantage. When p = q = 0.5, the benefits of both sides are 0, and it is a close race on this point. For the purpose of players maximizing the utility, the maximum utility of the calculator satisfies u 2 (p * = 0.1, q * = 0.5) = u 2 (p * = 0.9, q * = 0.5) ≥ u 2 (p, q * ), and the maximum utility of the client satisfies u 1 (p * = 0.5, q * = 0.1) = u 1 (p * = 0.5, q * = 0.9) ≥ u 1 (p * , q) observed from Figure 6 . According to Nash equilibrium, the client and the calculator adjust their strategies to improve the utility, and the mixed strategy P * 1 = (p * 11 , p * 12 ) and P * 2 = (p * 21 , p * 22 ) (where p * 11 , p * 12 , p * 21 , p * 22 represent the mixed strategies selected by the two with 0.1 or 0.9 the probability) make u 2 (P * 1 , P * 2 ) ≥ u 2 (P 1 , P * 2 ) and u 1 (P * 1 , P * 2 ) ≥ u 1 (P * 1 , P 2 ). At this time, the mutual information of both sides is each other's maximum and is 0.2111, and their utility is equal.
The game reaches the Nash equilibrium of mixed strategy, and the mixed strategy of each player is the optimal choice when given the mixed strategy of the other party. And the equilibrium point satisfies v 1 (P * 1 , P * 2 ) = v 2 (P * 1 , P * 2 ) and v 1 = min y∈S 2 E(x * , y) ≤ E(x * , y * ) ≤ max x∈S 1 E(x, y * ) = v 2 , then the mixed situation (x * , y * ) satisfying the equation is the optimal mixed strategy of the client and the calculator.
However, in the practical sense of delegation computation, this equilibrium is not the best result for efficient delegation computation. We should adjust p and q to the minimum, because the ideal strategy for delegating the computation is that the calculator chooses to send the correct result and the client accepts it successfully.
VI. DISCUSSION
This work mainly researches the capacity limitation of the delegated computation, which is a bounded result benefited from the convex function of mutual information. It is respectively the limit of attack and defense capacity of client and calculator, denoted as the delegation capacity limitation and the computation capacity limitation. The maximal attack and defense capacity limitation of the delegation channel and the computation channel are the maximum of the channel capacity, that is C x = C y = Max[I (X , Z )] = 0.5310. At this point, the expected utility of participants reaches the maximum value. Under different numerical conditions of p and q, we can calculate the corresponding channel capacity of the computation channel and the delegation channel respectively, so as to compare the player's antagonism ability. The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium point is obtained by the payment equivalence method (the same as mutual information equivalence) in the game theory; at this time the mixed strategy is optimal under the condition of optimal average mutual information.
In addition, when the computation capacity and the delegated capacity reach the maximum limitation, the computation channel capacity and the delegation channel capacity are fixed. At this point, we can find a coding method according to the Shannon channel coding theorem, such as Reed-Solomon codes, generalized Reed-Solomon codes, Bossen-Yau redundant residue codes and other error-correcting codes, to make all the information with code rate less than channel capacity C be transmitted from the sender to the receiver without error. The concrete construction scheme is still an open research problem.
The proposed method of delegated computation capacity limitation provides a simple solution to the problem of the anti-constraint of the communication system, and also may apply to other attack and defense systems.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced the capacity limitation concept for delegation computation, which is the basis of the strategy selection for both the calculator and the client. Based on the knowledge of information theory, this paper has considered the communication process between the calculator and the client, and has introduced the random variables to form the attack-defense communication model. We have researched the quantization method of capacity limitation in different modes through channel capacity. Although the work of this paper only gives a basic computation and delegation limitation model, a feasible system foundation has been established in order to solve the quantization problem of other ability limitation.
